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1.  The two faces of the nitrogen problem 1 
From an economic perspective, the sustainability of any development strategy is best tested by 2 
whether the per capita wealth it generates—the sum of produced, human and natural capital—3 
is maintained over time (Dasgupta 2001).  Development strategies that depend on the 4 
extraction of earth resources or that damage functioning ecosystems may still be sustainable, in 5 
this sense, providing that the profits generated (what economists refer to as the resource rents) 6 
are used to create renewable capital stocks of equivalent value (Dasgupta and Maler 2000; 7 
Hartwick 1977; Hotelling 1931; Solow 1974).  To test the sustainability of natural resource-8 
based development strategies, economists have developed measures of inclusive wealth that 9 
take account of changes in at least some environmental stocks (Arrow et al. 2012; Dasgupta 10 
and Mäler 2000; UNU-IHDP and UNEP 2012; World Bank 2006; World Bank 2010). Using one 11 
such measure of inclusive wealth, we consider the sustainability of development strategies that 12 
affect one of the most important of all environmental stocks—nitrogen.  13 
Nitrogen is essential for all life, and yet only a handful of microorganisms are capable of 14 
using it in its dominant form—dinitrogen (N2). Until relatively recently, all other species relied 15 
primarily on these microorganisms to convert N2 to the more usable ammonium (NH4
+) through 16 
the process of nitrogen fixation.  (Other microorganisms convert ammonium to nitrate (NO3
-) 17 
through nitrification, and a small amount of dinitrogen is converted directly to nitrate via non-18 
biological means, primarily lightning-induced atmospheric fixation.) For much of its history, 19 
agriculture depended on husbandry of the soil nitrogen necessary for plant growth—returning 20 
nutrients to the soil in the form of crop waste, planting nitrogen-fixing legumes, using mulches 21 
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or plant cover to protect the soil from erosion or nutrient leaching, or letting land lie fallow. In 22 
the early 1900’s, however, the Haber-Bosch process was developed, allowing humans to 23 
convert atmospheric dinitrogen to ammonium (and hence to nitrate) on industrial scales. Since 24 
that time, use of the nitrogen-bearing fertilizers that result from this process has risen steadily 25 
until humans now exceed microorganisms in their capacity to fix nitrogen. Galloway and 26 
Cowling (2002) and Galloway et al. (2004) estimated that by the end of the last century humans 27 
fixed just under 150 trillion grams of nitrogen Tg(N) per year—approximately 86 Tg(N)/yr from 28 
fertilizer production,  31 Tg(N)/yr from the expansion of nitrogen-fixing crops (via nitrogen-29 
fixing microorganisms), 13 Tg(N)/yr from other products, and 21 Tg(N) per year from fossil fuel 30 
consumption. By comparison, the total nitrogen fixed by both cyanobacteria and bacteria, 31 
which includes the 40 Tg(N)/yr from nitrogen-fixing crops, was only 108 Tg(N)/yr.  Moreover, 32 
the rate of anthropogenic nitrogen growth is still accelerating. By the middle of this century, 33 
nitrogen fixed by humans is expected to be on the order of 267 Tg(N)/yr compared to 224 34 
Tg(N)/yr fixed through natural processes (Galloway et al. 2004; Howarth et al. 2005). A more 35 
recent study by Townsend and Howarth (2010) argues that humans are now fixing nitrogen at 36 
twice the rate of natural processes.   37 
The Haber-Bosch process has underpinned virtually every successful development strategy 38 
over the last century. The growth of agricultural productivity allowed by the process has 39 
directly increased agricultural incomes by increasing yields on existing agricultural lands, and by 40 
allowing expansion of agriculture into areas previously deemed too infertile. It has made 41 
possible the replacement of nitrogen stocks lost through the conversion of forests and 42 
grasslands to agriculture. It has shortened fallow periods, and increased the number of crops 43 
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taken from individual fields each year.  Indeed, wherever nitrogen has been the limiting factor 44 
in crop growth, accelerating nitrogen applications have increased agricultural productivity. This 45 
increased agricultural productivity has sustained the dramatic growth of the human population 46 
and allowed diversion of human resources to a range of non-agricultural activities—the 47 
underpinning of all successful development strategies. The expansion of commerce and 48 
industry, the development of public and private services, the development of science and 49 
technology and the strengthening of the institutions of government have all been made 50 
possible by the growth of agricultural productivity (Perrings 2014).  51 
The treatment of nitrogen stocks has not been the same in all countries, however. Nor has it 52 
been neutral in its effects on species other than the targeted crops.  A relatively small 53 
proportion of the nitrogen applied in fertilizers to agricultural systems is stored in the system—54 
the rest is removed in the crop, leached into groundwater, carried away in surface run-off, 55 
volatilized to the atmosphere, or converted to other gaseous forms that escape to the 56 
atmosphere (Vitousek et al. 1997).   Of the total quantity of reactive nitrogen added to 57 
farmland, one estimate is that around 50% is removed in the crop, 25% is emitted to the 58 
atmosphere, 20% runs off into aquatic systems, and only 5% is stored in the soil (Smil 1999).  59 
Later estimates confirm the relatively low rate of N-accumulation in the soil (Galloway et al. 60 
2004; Schlesinger 2009; Van Breemen et al. 2002). While the proportion removed in the crop is 61 
sensitive to the level of nitrogen applications (Stevens et al. 2005) as well as other inputs 62 
(Vanlauwe et al. 2010), almost all applications are associated with some losses to the 63 
atmosphere and water.  64 
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In particular circumstances losses to the atmosphere and water can have undesirable 65 
effects. Nitrates in water, for instance, can compromise the blood’s ability to transport oxygen, 66 
affecting the young of many species aside from humans—including cattle, horses, sheep, pigs, 67 
and chickens (Kinzig and Socolow 1994). Excess nitrogen in one form or another has 68 
contributed to respiratory ailments, cardiac disease, and several cancers, and has altered the 69 
dynamics of several vector-borne diseases (Townsend et al. 2003).  Changes in nutrients have 70 
affected the abundance of pathogens by altering the relative density of hosts and vectors, host 71 
distribution, infection resistance, as well as pathogen virulence or toxicity (Johnson et al. 2010). 72 
Nitrogen-containing compounds carried away in surface runoff can enter coastal waters and 73 
have caused coastal eutrophication—characterized by excessive algal blooms, algal die-offs, 74 
and oxygen depletion. In the most severe forms, coastal eutrophication has led to extensive 75 
‘dead zones’—areas so depleted of oxygen they are incapable of supporting any life (Diaz and 76 
Rosenberg 2008). Excess fertilizer applications have also led to the conversion of ammonium or 77 
nitrate into nitrous oxide—an important greenhouse gas (Galloway and Cowling 2002).  78 
There are, in fact, two quite different dimensions to the nitrogen problem. On the one 79 
hand, failure to replace nitrogen released when relatively intact forests and grasslands are 80 
converted, or lost through erosion and harvesting on agricultural lands, leads to declining 81 
stocks of soil nitrogen, and declining crop yields (Liu et al. 2010)( see Figure 1). On the other, 82 
excess application of fertilizers has given rise to several forms of nitrogen pollution (see Figure 83 
2). Globally, 93% of all fertilizer applications occur in Asia, Europe and North America.  Sub-84 
Saharan Africa accounts for only 3% (Galloway et al. 2004). The problem of excess reactive 85 
nitrogen is overwhelmingly a problem of high and middle-income countries, nitrogen depletion 86 
5 
 
is overwhelmingly a problem of poor countries, and specifically of sub-Saharan Africa (Liu et al. 87 
2010). 88 
The mechanisms underlying nitrogen losses are reasonably well understood. In the late 89 
1990s Vitousek et al estimated that 40 Tg(N) per year was being lost from the burning of 90 
forests, grasslands, and wood fuels, while 20 Tg(N) per year was being lost when land was 91 
cleared for crops (Vitousek et al. 1997).  Such losses tend to occur in poor countries where 92 
agricultural growth depends on expansion of the area under cultivation rather than enhanced 93 
productivity on existing agricultural land. The net rate of nitrogen loss in such countries is a 94 
function of the rate at which nitrogen stocks are replaced through fertilizer applications. Since 95 
fertilizer applications also tend to be lower in poorer countries, and that is where the nitrogen 96 
depletion problem is most acute. Regionally, Sub-Saharan Africa is affected more than other 97 
developing areas. Net nitrogen losses in dominant cropping systems in Kenya in the late 20th 98 
century, for example, were estimated to be between 67 and 147 kg per ha per year compared 99 
to 3 and 32 kg per ha per year in Costa Rica (Stoorvogel and Smalling 1998). Indeed, soil fertility 100 
depletion has long been considered one of the main biophysical barriers limiting food 101 
production in Sub-Saharan Africa (Drechsel et al. 2001). It is estimated that the region lost 4.4 102 
million tons of nitrogen between 1980 and 2004, the major contributor to annual losses of soil 103 
nutrients valued on the order of $4 billion (International Fertilizer Development Center 2006). 104 
The magnitude of the N-depletion problem largely reflects the failure of the markets to 105 
signal the true scarcity of nitrogen—to record the externalities of land-clearance or nutrient 106 
runoff.  The proximate cause of N-depletion is loss of soil nutrients from land converted to 107 
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agriculture that is uncompensated by either fallows or fertilizers. Loss of nutrients may be due 108 
both to cropping and soil erosion (Montgomery 2007). Absent fertilizer applications, this leads 109 
to the overexploitation of existing nutrient stocks, declining yields, and land abandonment (as 110 
‘waste’ or ‘barren’ lands) (Pimentel et al. 1995). In many cases it is associated with the fact that 111 
converted lands are not subject to well-defined property rights.  Many converted lands are 112 
common pool resources to which access is only weakly regulated, if at all, being occupied by 113 
“squatters” with little or no security of tenure (Alston et al. 1996; Barbier and Burgess 2001; 114 
Niazi 2003). In countries where a significant proportion of the population produces their own 115 
food, population growth translates into increasing pressure on common pool resources. While 116 
these are not the only drivers of land use in developing countries (see, for example, Lambin et 117 
al. 2001), they have a fundamental role to play in the N-depletion problem. The impact of 118 
declining nutrient stocks increases with the share of the population that depends directly on 119 
agriculture.  At the same time, nutrient replacement is least likely in countries where farmers 120 
lack the resources to maintain soil fertility or have little incentive to do so given the lack of 121 
secure land tenure. The lack of well-defined rights to converted land ensures that resource 122 
users have very weak incentives to invest in the conservation or replacement of nutrient stocks, 123 
even when they have the resources to do so. 124 
 In much the same way, the N-pollution problem reflects the failure of markets or 125 
regulations to signal the cost of excess nitrogen (see, for example, Hanley 1990; Horner 1975; 126 
Moxey and White 1994; Semaan et al. 2007). If farmer’s are not faced with the costs of the off-127 
site impacts of nitrogen runoff, they may over-apply nitrogen-containing fertilizers on cropland. 128 
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This problem is exacerbated by government subsidies for fertilizer purchases and applications 129 
(Tilman et al. 2002).  130 
As a broad generalization, poor countries suffer more from N-depletion and rich countries 131 
from N-pollution, but there are exceptions. In this paper we focus on the relationship between 132 
nitrogen replacement, income and wealth. We do this against the background of a long-133 
standing, but ambiguous, literature on the relation between income and environmental change 134 
more generally.  A number of cross-sectional and longitudinal studies of the relationship 135 
between income and a range of pollutants have found that, in many cases, pollution has an 136 
inverted U-shaped relation to per capita income—the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve.  137 
That is, emissions of air- and water-borne pollutants frequently increase with per capita 138 
incomes at low levels of income, and decrease with per capita incomes at high levels of income 139 
(Cole et al. 1997; Seldon and Song 1994; Shafik 1994; Stern 2004; Stern and Common 2001).  140 
However, the relation is not consistent. For some pollutants, carbon dioxide and municipal solid 141 
waste for example, the relation with per capita income has been found to be monotonically 142 
increasing. For others, fecal coliform in drinking water for example, it has been found to be 143 
monotonically decreasing. For others still it has been found to have more than one turning 144 
point (Carson 2010; Cole et al. 1997).   145 
The implication of this literature is that in the initial stages of growth people elect to 146 
deplete environmental assets in order to build up produced assets, but as their income rises 147 
they reverse the process. Since the nitrogen content of soils is an important component of their 148 
value, the depletion of nitrogen stocks implies a reduction in the value of soil as an asset. Other 149 
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things being equal, therefore, it implies a reduction in wealth.  In this paper we first consider 150 
the relationship between income growth and changes in N-stocks. We then consider the 151 
relationship between N-replacement and national wealth—where wealth is taken to be 152 
inclusive of all forms of capital, including natural capital.  That is, we ask whether there is 153 
evidence for a trade-off between income and N-stocks, and if so how it is associated with 154 
changes in inclusive wealth.  155 
Current estimates of changes in inclusive wealth show that low-income countries tend to be 156 
affected more by losses of natural capital than rich countries (UNU-IHDP and UNEP 2012; World 157 
Bank 2006; World Bank 2010).  The measure of change in inclusive wealth used by the World 158 
Bank is the adjusted net savings rate. This is a record of changes in the value of assets that 159 
involves four adjustments to the measure of gross national savings recorded in the national 160 
income accounts: deduction of the depreciation of produced assets; addition of current 161 
expenditures on education (a proxy for investment in human capital); deduction of the 162 
depletion of selected natural resources (a proxy for depreciation of natural capital due to 163 
extraction); and deduction of damages due to selected emissions (a proxy for the depreciation 164 
of human and natural capital due to pollution) (World Bank 2010). If adjusted net Savings are 165 
negative, it indicates that the loss of capital through depreciation exceeds the level of new 166 
investment. We consider the relation between changes in stocks of nitrogen and changes in this 167 
measure of inclusive wealth. 168 
 169 
2.  Measuring N-replacement 170 
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There have been a number of attempts to measure anthropogenic effects on the nitrogen 171 
budget at global, regional, national and landscape scales. At global and regional scales, the 172 
focus has been on developing broad brush estimates of changes in the aggregate contribution 173 
made by major sources of reactive nitrogen: lightning, natural and anthropogenic bacterial and 174 
cyano-bacterial fixation, fossil fuel combustion and fertilizer production (Galloway et al. 2004). 175 
At the national scale (Howarth et al. 2002) studies have focused on anthropogenic changes in 176 
the nitrogen budget, including changes in NOx emissions from fossil-fuel combustion, but 177 
excluding natural sources of reactive nitrogen. Most studies at the landscape scale have 178 
similarly focused on anthropogenic effects. The Net Anthropogenic Nitrogen Input (NANI) mass-179 
balance model introduced by Howarth et al. (1996) has been applied to a number of 180 
watersheds at a variety of scales (Hong et al. 2012; Howarth et al. 2011; Swaney et al. 2012).  181 
The NANI is calculated as the sum of four components: atmospheric N-deposition, fertilizer N-182 
application, agricultural N-fixation and N in net food and feed imports. Negative fluxes remove 183 
N from watersheds, positive fluxes add N to watersheds (Hong et al. 2011).  184 
At the sectoral level, (Liu et al. 2010) estimated total nitrogen input in agriculture at the 185 
turn of the century to have been approximately 136.6 (Tg)N per year, half deriving from mineral 186 
nitrogen fertilizer, 16% from biofixation, manure, recycled crop residues, and atmospheric 187 
deposition accounting for 8–13% of the total input. Since our concern is with the effect of 188 
anthropogenic N fluxes on the value of land as an asset we focus on only those components of 189 
the global nitrogen budget that are a direct consequence of land management decisions: the 190 
conversion of land to agriculture, fertilizer applications, and the production of crops and 191 
livestock. We do not include industrial emissions.  Nor do we take account of the fate of N-192 
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exports. Where crops or livestock exports are disposed of affects the international distribution 193 
of nitrogen, but does not affect the nutrient content of the farmland from which exports derive. 194 
We make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the proportion of N 195 
added through fertilizer application or leguminous crops, and that is stored in agroecosystems, 196 
is the same for all countries. Although denitrification rates are likely to vary with climatic and 197 
other conditions (Galloway et al. 2004), we have insufficient information to correct for this.  198 
Second, we assume that the loss of nutrients through soil erosion due to land use change is the 199 
same for all countries. Once again, although there is evidence that soil erosion may be greater 200 
in some countries and some bioclimatic zones than in others (Stocking 2003), we do not have 201 
sufficient evidence to correct for this across our sample.  202 
Our measure of N-loss consists of three indexes for 68 countries1 (those countries where we 203 
had sufficient data to calculate the index) over the period 1964-2008. The first index is based on 204 
land use change. Nitrogen can be lost when forests or grasslands are cleared for other uses 205 
because soils are exposed, allowing faster decomposition, nitrogen cycling, and nitrogen losses 206 
to both air and water. We therefore calculated the annual change in arable plus permanent 207 
cropland. Additions to cropland can come from any biome, but in a majority of cases they 208 
derived from conversion of forests, grasslands, or savanna ecosystems. Data on land 209 
conversions were taken from the World Resources Institute (World Resources Institute 2011).  210 
                                                          
1
 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey, UK, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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The second index is based on crop production. Nitrogen is lost from cropping systems due 211 
to its removal in crops, but can be replaced due to planting of pulses (legumes). We took the 212 
average annual total cereal production for each nation (representing N-loss), subtracted from 213 
that the average annual total pulse production for (N-gain), and divided that by the average 214 
area under crops for each nation for the period 1964-2008. The index was normalized to 100 by 215 
dividing through by the country with the greatest output of non-nitrogen fixing crops per 216 
hectare of cropland. Data on crop production and crop production area also derived from the 217 
World Resources Institute Earth Trends (World Resources Institute 2011).   218 
The third index captures the relative intensity of N-loss from livestock. Nitrogen is lost to 219 
the system through the export of livestock and livestock products. Data on livestock were 220 
obtained from the Statistics Division of the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization 2012), while 221 
estimates of N-consumption per head were obtained from Hong et al. (2012). This was then 222 
used to calculate aggregate relative N-loss from livestock production and export per unit of land 223 
area, by taking tons of nitrogen lost per hectare and normalizing in the same way. 224 
Our overall measure of N-loss was the normalized sum of these three sub-indexes.  Figure 3 225 
reports the overall N-loss index for each country, averaged over the period 1964-2008, the 226 
countries being ranked (low to high) by per capita gross national product. To see the relative 227 
importance of each of the two crop-related causes of N-loss across the sample, Figure 4 reports 228 
these two N-loss indices together. It shows that average N-Loss due to cropping dominated N-229 
loss due to land conversion in cases such as Nepal, Egypt, The Netherlands, Japan and the USA, 230 
but that N-loss due to land conversion dominated in countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon and 231 
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Cuba. Whereas N-loss due to cropping bears a U-shaped relation to per capita GDP, N-loss due 232 
to land conversion increased with per capita gross national income up to around USD 2500, and 233 
then decreased. 234 
Our measure of N-gain is the relative intensity of fertilizer use and livestock excretion (both 235 
measured in kg of N applied per hectare). Data were obtained from the World Resources 236 
Institute Earth Trends (World Resources Institute 2011) and the Statistics Division of the FAO 237 
(Food and Agriculture Organization 2012). Data on excretions per head for the livestock species 238 
included derive from (Hong et al. 2012). The two indexes were summed, and then normalized 239 
by dividing through by the greatest intensity of fertilizer use plus livestock excretion in each 240 
year, and then by multiplying by 100.  The data on relative N-gain across the sample are 241 
summarized in Figure 5. The figure reports the average N-gain index for each country over the 242 
period 1964-2008, the countries being ranked (low to high) by per capita gross national 243 
product.  The curve is again U-shaped, the most highly ranked countries in terms of N-gain 244 
being at either end of the income spectrum (Bangladesh and the Netherlands). 245 
To calculate a measure of average net N-replacement during this time period, we then took 246 
the ratio of our N-gain and N-loss indexes. In a particular year this measure denotes the relative 247 
ranking of the country in that year with respect to net N-replacement. Changes from one year 248 
to the next are changes in the rank of the country, and not necessarily changes in the 249 
measure.  A country could, for example, record an increase in N-loss without affecting our 250 
measure of net N-replacement as long as other countries were behaving similarly. Over the 251 
whole period we found that very low-income countries typically ranked low for N-gain and high 252 
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for N-loss, middle-income countries ranked somewhat higher for both N-loss and N-gain, and 253 
high-income countries ranked high for both N-loss and N-gain. Net N-replacement bears an 254 
inverted U-shaped relation to per capita GDP (Figure 6). 255 
We are unable to identify the value of the net N-replacement index that indicates exact 256 
replacement (given the nature of its construction), and we note that it is constructed at the 257 
country rather than the landscape level given the constraints on available data. Nonetheless, 258 
the probability that nitrogen stocks are declining is greater the larger the value of the N-Loss 259 
index, and the smaller the value of the N-gain index.  Symmetrically, the probability that a 260 
country suffers from excess nitrogen is greater the larger the value of the N-gain index, and the 261 
smaller the value of the N-loss index. Figure 6 distinguishes between observations on net N-262 
replacement by region. The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest relative levels of net 263 
N-replacement, and were most at risk of net N-depletion. Mean net N-replacement in Asia, and 264 
in Central and South America was higher, but for some countries was still consistent with 265 
positive rates of net N-depletion. Mean net N-replacement was highest for the countries 266 
associated with intensive agriculture in Europe, Oceana and the Middle East, but the range of 267 
net N-replacement in Europe and Oceana was also greater than elsewhere. One other striking 268 
regional pattern is that the countries of North Africa and the Middle East typically had higher 269 
levels of nitrogen gain and lower levels of N-loss than elsewhere and, independent of their 270 
income level, had higher levels of net N-replacement.  Libya, Lebanon and Israel, with 271 
extremely different per capita gross national income levels, all had amongst the highest levels 272 
of net N-replacement recorded.  Such countries were most likely to experience N-pollution. 273 
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 274 
3. Analyzing the sustainability implications of N-replacement 275 
We approached our analysis of the sustainability of the processes behind these indexes in 276 
two steps. In a first step we explored the relation between net N-replacement and the three 277 
factors commonly implicated in resource depletion externalities:  income, population pressure, 278 
and the effectiveness of institutions. For our measure of institutional effectiveness we elected 279 
to use the broad characterization of governance adopted by the Polity IV project (Societal-280 
Systems Research Inc 2010). This measure summarizes a set of political conditions that are 281 
themselves correlated with the property rights, market structures, and regulatory conditions 282 
required for farmers to be able to capture the benefits of investments in soil condition.  Rural 283 
population pressure was measured by the proportion of population in rural areas, obtained 284 
from FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture Organization 2012). This measure reflects the effects both 285 
of national dependence on agriculture and of relative fertility, the two most important 286 
elements in rural population pressure on land resources.  Finally, income was approximated by 287 
per capita GDP, the data again deriving from the World Resources Institute Earth Trends (World 288 
Resources Institute 2011). 289 
The data for 67 countries were used to estimate a model of the form: 290 
 
Y
it
=a +g
t
+d
i
+ X
it
b
it
+e
it
  291 
where Yit, the dependent variable, denotes net N-replacement by country i in year t; Xit is a 292 
vector of independent variables, the components of which are per capita income, per capita 293 
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income squared, rural population pressure and institutional effectiveness; the εit are error 294 
terms (unaccounted for contributions to the dependent variable) for i = 1,2,…M cross-295 
sectional units in periods t = 1,2,…T; and α, γt and δi  represent the overall constant, period 296 
and cross-section specific effects (random or fixed) respectively.2 The results are reported in 297 
Table 1 and Figure 7. 298 
An orthogonality test for random effects was also applied, and a Hausman test was used to 299 
check for inconsistency in the random effects estimates,3 since we considered it to be likely that 300 
the explanatory variables would be correlated with country specific characteristics contained in 301 
the error component, like climate and geography. The test rejected the null that the random 302 
effects model is preferred to the fixed effects model. 303 
To see the link between N-loss and N-gain on changes in inclusive wealth, we then estimated 304 
OLS and FE models of adjusted net savings as a function of N-loss and N-gain separately. To 305 
control for non-observable specific effects of the drivers of net N-replacement on wealth, we also 306 
estimated a two stage least squares (2SLS) model of adjusted net savings, in which net N-307 
replacement was treated as an endogenous explanatory variable instrumented on income, 308 
                                                          
2 Since heteroskedasticity of the data potentially compromises both fixed and random effects models Baltagi, B. H. 
2001, Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Chichester, John Wiley., we applied a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
specification, in which 
 
bˆ = X 'F
-1
X( )
-1
XF
-1
Y  
 and the block diagonal covariance matrix took the form 
 
F = mÄ j
T
+ e( ) mÄ j
T
+ e( ) '[ ] = I
N
ÄF
i
 .The White cross-section method was used in which the pooled 
regression was treated as a multivariate regression, and White-type robust standard errors for the system of 
equations were computed. The estimator was found to robust with respect to cross-equation correlation as well as 
to different error variances in each cross-section. 
3
 This test compares the slope parameters estimated for FE and RE models (a significant difference implying that 
the RE model is estimated inconsistently due to correlation between the independent variables and the error 
components). The FE model can, however, be estimated consistently although the estimated parameters are 
conditional on the country and time effects in the selected sample of data Hsiao, C. 1986, Analysis of Panel Data: 
Econometric Society monographs, v. 11. New York, Cambridge University Press.. 
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institutions and rural population pressure. Because data on adjusted net savings were not 309 
available for all countries in our sample, we worked with a reduced data set of 58 countries.4 310 
Instrumenting the N-replacement index had the effect of increasing the magnitude of both 311 
coefficients.5 These results are reported in Table 2 and Figure 8.  312 
 313 
4.  Results and Discussion 314 
While the low R2 values indicate a large amount of unexplained variance in the estimated 315 
models, the significance of the coefficients on the independent variables allows us to draw 316 
inferences about their impact on net N-replacement and inclusive wealth. To summarize, we 317 
found that the index of net N-replacement is extremely low at low levels of per capita GDP, and 318 
that it is increasing in per capita GDP up to a point, beyond which it declines. In the poorest 319 
countries, depletion of nitrogen from soils converted to agriculture is not compensated through 320 
fertilizer application, cropping with legumes, livestock excretion, or fallowing. However, we also 321 
found that the rate at which net N-replacement increases with per capita income slows as per 322 
capita incomes rise, eventually becoming negative. This effect was seen in all models estimated: 323 
ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE).  We found the fixed 324 
effects model to provide the best fit to the data, implying that country-specific characteristics 325 
significantly affect the relation between net N-replacement and the anthropogenic drivers of 326 
                                                          
4
 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, 
Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
5
 A Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions failed to reject the null that the instruments were uncorrelated with 
the error term and that the specification was correct at the 1% level. In addition, the Cragg-Donald F-statistic 
indicated that the group of instruments used was not weak. 
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changes in nitrogen stocks (Table 1). We found, in addition, that net N-replacement increased 327 
with the effectiveness of institutions, and decreased with the proportion of the population in 328 
rural areas in both random and fixed effects models.  The effectiveness of institutions was 329 
measured by a broad index of governance and democracy and not a dedicated measure of land 330 
tenure, but we expect the two to be correlated. 331 
We then considered the impact of net N-replacement on inclusive wealth using the ordinary 332 
least squares, fixed effects, and a two stage least squares model in which the first stage 333 
captured the indirect effects of the anthropogenic drivers analyzed earlier. We found that in 334 
countries with low levels of relative N-loss, land conversion and/or cropping intensity are 335 
positively correlated with adjusted net savings. That is, land conversion and productivity gains 336 
in agriculture are both consistent with increasing inclusive wealth in poor countries, implying 337 
that gains from the creation of productive lands more than offsets losses due to nitrogen 338 
released in conversion. However, in countries with high levels of relative N-loss, further land 339 
conversion or cropping intensity has the opposite effect.  340 
The same basic relationship was observed in all three models (see Table 2, Figure 8a). In the 341 
OLS and RE models the effect was relatively weak.  Once the indirect effects of the income and 342 
other drivers of N-loss and N-gain were taken into account in the two stage least squares 343 
model, on the other hand, we found a much stronger effect. Specifically, an increase in N-loss in 344 
poor countries is strongly associated with an increase in adjusted net savings (and hence 345 
inclusive wealth). As relative N-loss increases (in middle and high income countries), however, 346 
the effect switches from positive to negative. Beyond the turning point any further N-loss is 347 
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associated with declining rates of growth in inclusive wealth. By contrast, increasing relative N-348 
gain was positively associated with growing inclusive wealth at all levels of relative N-gain 349 
(Figure 8b).  The effect attenuated in both the OLS and 2SLS models, but not in the FE model. 350 
What does this finding mean? The stylized facts of the two sides of the nitrogen problem 351 
will be familiar to many.  Few will be surprised by the fact that poor countries are generally 352 
characterized by N-depletion, or that rich countries are characterized by N-pollution.  Indeed, 353 
the second problem has already attracted considerable attention. Most work has focused on 354 
establishing conditions in which farmers are confronted by the social costs of excessive nutrient 355 
applications—to internalize the external costs and benefits of N-application (Moomaw 2002). 356 
Amongst the most important issues to be addressed here are policies that drive down the 357 
private cost of N-fertilizers (i.e. that subsidize nitrogen application (Anderson et al. 2006; Barde 358 
and Honkatukia 2004; OECD 2003; Schmid et al. 2007).  359 
What may be more surprising are the implications of these stylized facts for the 360 
sustainability of the associated development strategies. We might expect that the 361 
uncompensated loss of soil nitrogen in poorer countries would be associated with declining 362 
rates of growth of inclusive per capita wealth.  That is what we find. What is less intuitive is that 363 
increasing fertilizer application in both rich and poor countries can increase per capita inclusive 364 
wealth.  365 
Since N-gain can compensate for N-loss, the impact of changes in relative N-replacement 366 
depends on the factors affecting both land conversion and fertilizer use. These factors tend to 367 
depress fertilizer use in the poorest countries, but their effect weakens steadily as per capita 368 
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incomes rise.  This is consistent with the evidence that adjusted net savings have been lowest in 369 
the poorest countries, and especially in the countries (largely in Sub-Saharan Africa) in the 370 
International Monetary Fund’s ‘Heavily Indebted Poor Country’ program.6  But these are 371 
precisely the countries where enhanced fertilizer application could have the greatest positive 372 
impact on inclusive wealth. Specifically, increasing fertilizer application can increase wealth 373 
most in cases where relative N-replacement has been low (poor countries), but it still has a 374 
positive effect on wealth even in cases where N-pollution is substantial. 375 
The impact of relative net N-replacement on wealth may not be large, but it is statistically 376 
significant. Its policy implications are therefore worth considering.  Resolving the depletion 377 
problem in poor countries requires that the positive feedbacks between poverty, population, 378 
productivity and environmental change be broken.  This in turn requires establishment of the 379 
conditions in which farmers are able to capture the benefits of investment in nutrient stocks.  380 
There are a number of elements to this, including the establishment of security of tenure and 381 
property rights, the enhancement of credit and insurance markets, together with the 382 
reestablishment of extension services (Barrett 2013).  383 
In the poorest countries the majority of the population depends for its livelihood on 384 
agricultural and forest products and has little opportunity to engage in other activities.  This 385 
effectively reduces the scope for substituting other assets for agricultural land or forest 386 
                                                          
6
 Currently Afghanistan, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Republic of Congo, 
Rwanda, São Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, The Gambia, Togo, Uganda, and 
Zambia. 
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resources, and so increases the importance of investment to maintain the productive capacity 387 
of those resources. To the question ‘does poverty hurt the environment?’ the answer in the 388 
case of N-depletion is ‘yes’. The fact the highly indebted poor countries make the least 389 
intensive use of N-fertilizers indicates that income is a constraining factor.  The fact that their 390 
failure to use N-fertilizers locks them into low (and declining) yields indicates that the existence 391 
of a poverty trap. To the question ‘does environmental degradation hurt the poor?’ the answer 392 
is also ‘yes’.  In fact there is a more direct relation between declining productivity, yields and 393 
income in the case of N-depletion than in most problems involving environmental degradation.  394 
The growing awareness of the tight connections between poverty and at least some forms 395 
of environmental change is already driving a number of initiatives at the international level. The 396 
striking relation between N-replacement, dependence on agriculture and poverty is strongest in 397 
countries that are already being targeted for debt relief under the International Monetary 398 
Fund’s Heavily Indebted Poor Country program.  That program has the potential to be helpful to 399 
the nitrogen problem. Debt relief under the program is conditional on the development of 400 
poverty reduction strategies. The resources freed up under the debt relief program and the 401 
poverty reduction strategy have the potential to help both conserve/rebuild environmental 402 
assets at risk from N-depletion, and to develop the institutional conditions required to 403 
encourage private investment in nutrient stocks. Given the social cost of the loss of assets on 404 
which as much as three quarters of the population in HIPC states depends, it would be worth 405 
considering the scope for targeting this problem in the HIPC program. 406 
 407 
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Table  1  Results for ordinary least squares (OLS), random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) models of net N-replacement as a 558 
function of  income, rural population pressure and institutional effectiveness 559 
Model OLS RE FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDPc 1.712*** 1.482*** 1.591*** 
 (0.211) (0.569) (0.564) 
Log GDPc2 -0.097*** -0.066** -0.070** 
 (0.013) (0.032) (0.035) 
Log institutions 0.259*** 0.104*** 0.095** 
 (0.018) (0.038) (0.018) 
Log percentage of rural population 0.183*** -0.396*** -0.457*** 
 (0.031) (0.003) (0.144) 
Constant -9.468*** 
(0.907) 
-7.366*** 
(2.631) 
-7.742*** 
(2.605) 
    
R2  0.094 0.031 0.209 
F test 0.000  0.000 
Wald  0.000  
Hausman FE v. RE   0.000 
Nobs/Countries 3,015/67 3,015/67 3,015/67 
                              560
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. All tests’ values reported are probabilities. 561 
*Significant at 10%. 562 
**Significant at 5% 563 
***Significant at 1%. 564 
  565 
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Table 2   Results for ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) and two stage least squares (2SLS) models of adjusted net savings 566 
as a function of net N-loss and N-gain  567 
Model Ordinary Least Squares Fixed Effects  Two Stage Least Squares 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) (7)  (8) 
 N-loss N-gain N-loss N-gain N-loss N-gain 
Index 0.146*** 0.128*** 0.009 0.381*** 0.710* 0.640** 
 (0. 017) (0.015) (0.042) (0.108) (0.335) (0.001) 
Index2 -0.001*** -0.0005)*** -0.000 0.001*** -0.004* -0.007** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.002) 0.003 
Constant 4.535*** 6.993*** 9.752*** -0.436*** -13.275 -6.604 
 (0.666) (0.476) (1.227) (2.662) (11.271) (4.890) 
       
R2  0.075 0.065 0.041 0.079 0.062 0.062 
F test 0.000 0.000     
Wald test   0.795 0.000 0.104 0.003 
Hausman FE v. RE   0.007 0.000   
Hansen J     0.120 0.529 
Cragg-Donald F     11.08 87.27 
Nobs/Countries 1197 1197 1197/57 1,197/57 1,197/57 1,197/57 
 568 
*    Significant at 10%. 569 
**  Significant at 5% 570 
***Significant at 1%. 571 
  572 
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Figure captions 573 
 574 
Figure 1 575 
An algal bloom due to nitrogen pollution of the St. Johns River near million-dollar homes in Jacksonville, Florida. 576 
Source:  Ocean River Institute, www.oceanriver.org. 577 
 578 
Figure 2 579 
Land clearance for agriculture in the Mau Forest of Kenya (the largest indigenous forest in East Africa). 580 
Source:  Christian Lambrechts, United Nations Environment Program. 581 
 582 
Figure 3 583 
Index of average N-loss by per capita GDP. The figure reports average annual relative nitrogen loss from all sources by country 1964-584 
2008. Countries are ordered in terms of per capita GDP.  The solid line indicates the best line of fit to these data, not controlling for 585 
any other variables.  Annual relative nitrogen loss is decreasing in per capita gross national income at low levels of income, but is 586 
increasing in income at intermediate and high levels of income. 587 
Sources: Data were obtained from the World Resources Institute’s Earth Trends database (World Resources Institute 2011) and 588 
FAOSTAT at Food and Agriculture Organization (2012). 589 
 590 
Figure 4 591 
Average N-loss indices for N-depletion from land conversion, and from cropping, by country, ranked by per capita gross national 592 
income.  The figure reports average annual relative nitrogen loss by source and by country, countries being ordered in terms of per 593 
capita gross national income.  The solid lines indicate the best line of fit to each series: a U-shaped curve for N-loss due to cropping, 594 
but an inverted U-shaped curve for N-loss due to land use change.  Annual relative nitrogen loss from cropping first decreases and 595 
then increases as per capita gross national incomes rise.  Annual relative nitrogen loss from land conversion is the opposite.  596 
Sources: Data were obtained from the World Resources Institute’s Earth Trends database (World Resources Institute 2011). 597 
 598 
Figure 5  599 
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Index of average N-gain by per capita GDP.  The figure average annual relative nitrogen gains from all sources by country 1964-2008 600 
on a log scale, countries being ordered in terms of per capita GDP.  The solid lines indicate the best line of fit to each series, not 601 
controlling for any other variables. Annual relative nitrogen gains first decrease and then increase as per capita gross national 602 
incomes rise.   603 
Sources: Data were obtained from the World Resources Institute’s Earth Trends database (World Resources Institute 2011) and 604 
FAOSTAT at Food and Agriculture Organization (2012). 605 
 606 
 607 
Figure 6 608 
Average relative net N-replacement by per capita GDP.  The figure reports average annual relative net nitrogen replacement by 609 
country (and by region). Regions covered comprise: Sub-Saharan Africa (black), North Africa and the Middle East (red), Asia (orange), 610 
Central and South America, and the Caribbean (grey), Europe (dark blue), Oceana (green) and North America (light blue). The solid 611 
line indicates the best line of fit to the data, not controlling for other variables.  Annual average relative net N-replacement is first 612 
increasing and then decreasing in income.  613 
Sources: Data were obtained from the World Resources Institute’s Earth Trends database (World Resources Institute 2011) and 614 
FAOSTAT at Food and Agriculture Organization (2012). 615 
 616 
Figure 7   617 
The relation between the net N-replacement index and per capita income.  Net N-replacement initially increases rapidly with per 618 
capita gross national income but the effect weakens as per capita incomes rise further. 619 
Sources:  See text for data sources 620 
 621 
Figure 8    622 
The relation between adjusted net savings and N-loss in the OLS, RE and 2SLS models. Panel (a): Per capita inclusive wealth increases 623 
with net N-loss if initial levels of land conversion and cropping activity are low, but the effect is weaker if initial levels of land 624 
conversion and cropping activity are high. If the indirect effect of the anthropogenic drivers of N-loss is taken into account (2SLS 625 
models), the rate of growth of per capita inclusive wealth is negative at low levels of relative N-loss, becoming positive as the N-loss 626 
29 
 
index increases, but falling again at high relative levels of N-loss.  Panel (b): By contrast, per capita inclusive wealth increases 627 
monotonically with net N-gain. Whereas the rate of increase slows in both the OLS and 2SLS models, it accelerates in the FE model.    628 
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Figure 6 641 
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Figure 7 643 
 644 
  645 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Model 
Random Effects Model 
Fixed Effects Model 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Lo
g 
N
-r
e
p
la
ce
m
e
n
t 
Log Gross Domestic Product Per  Capita 
LnN-replacement OLS LnN-replacement RE LnN-replacement FE
37 
 
Figure 8 (a) 646 
 647 
  648 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Model 
Fixed Effects Model 
Two Stage Least Squares 
Model -15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
A
d
ju
st
e
d
 N
e
t 
Sa
vi
n
gs
 R
at
e
 
N-loss index 
ANS N-loss OLS ANS  N-loss FE ANS  N-loss 2SLS
38 
 
Figure 8 (b) 649 
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